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Abatract
We present an econometrically tractable life-cycle labor supply model to use with
panel data that includes an intertemporally progressive tax on uncertain wage and
nonwage incomes. We use a two-stage fixed-effects generalized method-of-moments
approach to estimate first intratemporal and then intertemporal preferences parameters.
Extensive specification testing demonstrates the need for panel data to incorporate joint
taxation of labor and nonlabor incomes and the sensitivity of structural labor supply
parameter estimates to modeling choices. Results for prime-aged men from the Panel
Study ofIncome Dynamics show that the current wage (gross or net) is not exogenous,
the researcher need include common year-specific effects as well as worker-specific
effects, the parameter estimates are sensitive to how one measures the rate ofpay, and the
budget constraint is time nonseparable. In simulations ofthe Iabor supply and welfaze
effects oftaxes we found that the tax reforms ofthe 1980s stimulated prime-age men's
labor supplied by about three percent, reduced deadweight loss by about 16 percent, but
were not self financing.
JEL Classification: J22
Key Words: labor supply, method ofmoments, nonlineaz taxes, panel data,
time nonseparability2
1. Introduction
Consider the two strands ofempirical labor supply research. The macrceconomic
literature has focused on workers' willingness to substitute into and out ofleisure as real
wages fluctuate, which is crucial to understanding the cyclicality of hours worked and
(unkmployment (Kniesner and Goldsmith 1987). Micro labor supply research has as a
main theme the work-incentive effects of transfers and taxes, including policies such as
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Moffitt 1992,
Bosworth and Burtless 1992, Eissa 1995). A shortcoming in the empirical labor supply
literature, micro and macro, is a lack of attention to the life~ycle effects oftaxes and
trartsfers. We extend the economic literattu~e by using panel data to estimate
intnitemporal preferences parameters that interest micro economists and intertemporal
preferences patameters that interest macro economists while examining the labor supply
effects ofintertemporally pmgressive joint taxation ofwage and interest incomes.
The great leap forward in quantifying the labor supply effects oftaxes came with
econometric models acknowledging unobserved heterogeneity and measurement errors
when the budget constraint is piecewise linear due to tax and transfer programs (Burtless
and Hausman 1978, Hausman 1981a). Econometric models ofIabor supply including
income taxes are still genetally static and do not capture intertemporal effects of tax
reforms. A substantive, but orthogonal, branch ofempirical Iabor supply research has
focused on intertemporal substitutability of Iabor while ignoring the influence of income
taxes and transfers (Heckman and MaCurdy 1980, 1982; MaCurdy 1981, 1985; Altonji
1986; Mankiw, Rotemberg, and Stunmers 1985). ~ Incorporating the realism of interest
~MaCurdy (1983) is an exception to the generally separate research on life-cycle labor supply and research
using the static model to estimate labor supply tax effects. MaCurdy ignon~ capital-income taxation,
however, which is contrary to most countries' tax systems. Because he lineariud the budget constraint
whik applying inatrumental-variabks estimation to the transformed, sometimes nonconvex, choice set
MaCurdy's parameter estimatq may also be incwnsistent.3
income taxation along with wage taxation complicates the econometric model because
dual taxation generates time nonseparabilities in the budget constraint (Blomquist 1985).
A regularly appearing result in empirical research on labor supply, static or dynamic,
including or ignoring wage taxation, is that intratemporal (unkompensated wage effects
and intertemporal substitution effects are small and imprecisely estimated.2 There is even
little agreement on whether the estimated compensated wage effect is positive or ifthe
Slutsky matrix conditions hold empirically (Killingsworth 1983, Pencavel 1986, Conway
and Kniesner 1994). A positive (unkompensated wage effect means that moving to a
flatter tax induces more hours worked and reduces deadweight loss while a negative
(unkompensated wage effect produces economic effects opposite those usually intended
by proponents oftax reform.3 The lack of consensus on the magnitude and sign of
compensated wage effects continues to muddy discussions of the welfare implications of
a flatter tax structure (Hausman 1981 a, Hall and Rabushka 1983, MaCurdy 1992).
Our research produces what we argue are improved estimates of the work incentive
effects ofprogressive income taxation on life-cycle labor supply. We present a two-stage
generalized method-of-moments econometric model that first estimates intratemporal
wage effects from labor supply conditioned on asset positions at the beginning and end of
the period. Instead ofthe usual piecewise-linear budget set we use a continuously
differentiable smooth budget constraint to mitigate the problem of ineasurement errors
created by incorrectly imputing the marginal tax rate (MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch
1990; Flood and MaCurdy 1992). Moreover, maximum likelihood estimation (Burtless
and Hausman 1978, Hausman 1981a) enstues satisfaction of the Slutsky condition, a
positive wage effect, and a negative income effect, ruling out a downward sloping
ZThere are exceptions who found intertemporal substitution elasticities exceeding t I.0 by including a
participation decision and higher than annual frequency data (Jakubson 1988, Rogerson and Rupert 1991,
and Kimmel and Kniesner 1993).
3Negative substitution effects can appear, a priori, in a life-cycle model due to time nonseparabilities
caused by nonlinear income taxes (Blomquist 1985).4
estimated labor supply function on a priori statistical grounds (MaCurdy 1992). Perhaps
most important from a practical standpoint, maximum likelihood estimation rests on the
empirically untenable ground ofan exogenous pre-tax wage. The instrumental-variables
approach we take is more general because it permits a negadve estimated uncompensated
wage effxt on labor supply and dces not require gross wage rate exogeneity.
After obtaining consistent estimates ofintratemporal Iabor supply behavior we then
apply a second stage generalized method-of-moments estimator to the Euler condition for
the marginal utility ofnet wealth to recover intertemporal preferences parameters
underlying fluctuations in labor supply. We compute anticipated and unandcipated
intertemporal labor supply wage elasticities with lifetime preferences parameters. Our
estimates for prime-aged U.S. men contribute to both the micm and macro empirical
Iabor supply literatur~es.
We find the following results ofnote. The compensated wage effect is sensitive to
the wage measure and instrument set. There is evidence of time nonseparability in the
budget constraint supporting~the estimator we develop. Most importantly, our results
support the need to use panel data and to iacorporate thejoint nonlinear taxation ofwage
and nonwage income in labor supply research. Simulations with our results indicate that
recent U.S. tax refonns stimulated Iabor supplied, reduced deadweight loss, but were not
self financing.
2. Lite-Cycle Labor Snpply with Joint Noolinear Wage and Ioterest Income Taxes
A major innovation in estimating life-cycle Iabor supply has been to recognize that in
an environment of economic certainty extra-period information can be summarized by a
Iatent time-invariant worlcer-spceific effect (d, the marginal utility ofwealth) so that the
estimating oquation needs only curt~ertt period economic information (Heckman and
MaCurdy 1980, 1982; MaCurdy 1981). In an environment of(unkertain wages and
interest rates contempon~neous net dissaving (~, - r, A,-, - ~A, ) is sufficient to
summarize extra-period infonnation, again simplifying estimation (MaCurdy 1983;5
Blundell and Walker 1986; Blundell, Meghir, and Neves 1993). The empirical
convenience of estimating labor supply functions conditioned on .i or ~, is maíntained
when wage income is taxed (non)lineazly or when wage and interest incomes are jointly
taxed linearly. A theoretically valid econometric labor supply model becomes more
complicated when wage and interest incomes are jointly taxed nonlineazly, as is true in
most Western economies (Blomquist 1985).
To see the complications introduced byjoint nonlineaz taxation of labor and capital
incomes consider a person who has preferences over consumption, C, , and hours of paid
work, h, ,( t- l. .. T). Preferences over consumption and labor supply are defined by a
strictly concave utility function, U- U(C, ,h, ), and the choice set is given by a budget
wnstraint, g(C, ,h, , r, ,W, , T( I, , ~r)) - 0, where r, and W, are time vectors ofreal interest
and real wage rates and T(I,,~c) is a nonlineaz tax function defined over the time vector
of taxable income (!, ) and tax parameters (~r). As Blomquist (1985, pp. 517-518) notes,
if the researcher imposes no time separability properties on the lifetime utility function or
budget constraint then a change in the wage rate in period t( W, ) will affect consumption
and labor choices in period tfl through three channels: (i) it will tighten or slacken the
budget constraint, which produces a wealth effect, (ii) it will alter C, or h, , which in tum
alters the indifference curves between consumption and labor choices in the next period,
tfl, and (iii) it will alter marginal prices and wages in period ttl, which is due to
nonlinear income taxation.
Imposing intertemporal separability on the lifetime utility function eliminates the
intertemporal preferences effect of a change in wages, channel (ii), and imposing
intertemporal sepazability in the budget constraint by, say, linear taxes, T(!, ,~r) - irl, ,
eliminates the intertemporal mazginal price effect, channel (iii), so that intertemporal
separability of lifetime preferences and the budget constraint means that a change in the
current wage rate, W, , has only a wealth effect on future labor supply, h,,, . The first-6
order condition for an interior maximtun ofhotus worked under intertempotal
separability in preferences and budgets is
oT! w, ltr,~i(1-it) aI
~, w,.~ 1 fP ~,.i
where pis the subjective discount rate. The first-order condition underjoint separability
permits one to write labor supply in an environment of economic certainty as a function
of .i., W, and ~r h, - h(W, (1- rr),.i), or in an economic environment of uncertainty as a
function offt, W, and ~ h, - h(W, (1- ~r),~, ); that is, the marginal utility ofwealth or
dissaving function as sufficient statistics for extra-period (typically unmeasured)
information.
If, however, the reseatcher allows a trealistically progressive tax function over wage
and interest incomes then current wage changt,s will affect the futuro nt:t wagc and
inten.st rates (channel (iii)) so that achange in W, will have both wealth and substitution
effects on h„~ ! In particular, the first-order conditions underjoint nonlinear taxation are
dl -W,[l-T'(!,))[lfr,.~(1-T'(I,.t))] dl (2)
~, - K;.~~l-T'(I,.~)lhfP) ~~.~'
where T'(l, ) is the marginal tax rate evaluated at period I income. Unlike the linear tax
case the after-tax interest rate is now endogenous with labor supply in both periods t and
If l. Moreover, period t labor supply is now a function ofthe marginal utility ofwealth,
the real after-tax wage in period t, and the discounted after-tax wage in period tt! so that
h, - h(W, (1- T'(!, )),W,~, (1- T'(1,~, )), ~.) . Unless one is willing to asstune knowledge
offuture wages, prices, taxes, and inter~est rates the ~,-constant Iabor supply specification
will not be of much practical use when there isjoint nonlinear taxation.
However, Blomquist (1985) notes that under two-stage budgeting it is still possible to
estimate consistently the inttatemporal utility parameters by replacing the sufïicicnt net
dissaving statistic p, with beginning-of-period assets ( A,-, ) and end-of-period assets
aNote that imposing intertemporal separability on the budget constraint but allowing intertemporally
nonsepvable preferences, perhaps via rational habit fortnation, leads to models found in Hotz, Kydland,
and Sedlacek (1988) and Bover (1991).( A, ), where starting assets ( A,-, ) captures the influence of past decisions (Blundell and
Walker 1986, p. 543) and ending assets ( A, ) captures the influence ofnext period's
prices. Contemporaneous net dissaving (~t, ) is no longer a sufficient statistic on its own
for extra-period information because dissaving only permits future prices to have a wealth
effect rather than both the wealth and substitution effects fromjoint nonlinear taxation.
Finally, because Blomquist was unconcerned with intertemporal identification he did not
note that the second stage, estimating intertemporal preferences via the Euler equation for
the evolution of the marginal utility of net wealth, must also be modified for conditioning
on current and lagged assets in the first step of estimation. The two-step model we
employ conditions both estimating equations, the labor supply and Euler equations, on
current and lagged assets.
2.1 T6e Iudirect Utility Fuuction
We begin with the indirect utility functions
{wr(~r, Ar, Ar-I; A)j(Ita,) -1} I(1 t ar), (3)
where V, (.) is a monotonically increasing function ofthe net real wage (m, ) and assets
( Ar and A,-, ) conditioned on the vector of intratemporal preferences parameters (A);
a, - ap t~k akZw are time varying intertemporal preferences parameters measuring risk
aversion with Z a set of observable demographics (MaCurdy 1983; Browning 1986;
Blundell, Fry, and Meghir 1990). Thè intertemporal preferences parameters, a~ ,
determine the allocation ofincome and saving overtime (Blundell, Fry, and Meghir
1990). Our two-step process first estimates the intratemporal preferences parameters, A,
then uses Á to estimate the intertemporal preferences parameters, a~, which are needed to
compute life-cycle labor supply elasticities. Specifically, in the first stage we estimate a
labor supply function conditioned on asset accumulation and in the second stage estimate
the Euler equation for the path ofthe marginal utility of net wealth. A two-step approach
SThe indirect utility function is a preferred starting point because oflimited consumption infortnation in
our data set.8
is needed because only intratemporal preferettces parameters, A, in the indirect utility
function in (3), are identifiable from the labor supply schedule we estimate in step one.
2.2 A Life-Cycle Consistent Labor Supply Fuuction
To facilitate comparisons to the seminal econometric research on labor supply tax
effects we purposely selected the indirect utility function underlying the popular linear
Iabor supp[y fimction to estimate intratemporal preferences (Burtless and Hausman 1978;
Hausman 1981a).6 If h,' denotes a worker's desired labor supply
~' - ~r } ~-1 } ,~r } X~r , (a)
where X~ is a vector of fixed and time-varying demographics affecting intratemporal
preferences for work, and A~[a,ó, 4,r ]' are estlmated intratemporal preferences
parameters we used in estimating the marginal utility of wealth equation. Current and
lagged assets, A,-i and .ft, are sufficient statistics for capturing extra-period information
in our two-stage budgeting model with joint nonlinear wage and capital income taxation
(as is also S, together with r~Af-I as Blomquist (1985) notes). Equation (4) has been
termed a life-cycle consistent labor supply function (Biundell and Walker 1986).~
23 Marginal Utility ofNet Wealth
Under the assumption ofrational expectations and joint wage and interest income
taxes the marginal uti(ity ofnet wealth is
Q[(1t.,.~)~a.~]-~.~,s,.~. (g)
bv,(~)-e~[A,-~ t(aw, ~2ó)-(a ~2ó2)t(X~Y ~2ë)1 t e~[A~ t(amr ~24)-(a ~2f2)t(Xir 12Í)].
'IT~e linear labor supply function in (4) coenes from application ofRoys Identity first with respect to e{. and
A,-~ 1óen with respect to aui snd A„ or ly -[(BVr ~~i)~(~r ~~r-1) t(~r ~~r) I(óY, Id.l,)] . Although
the two-stsge budgeting approech we adoptdoes not constrain the functional form ofintratemporal
preferences, estimating the indirect utility function quickly becomes intractabk with more flexible
functional fortns. See Stern (1986) for a useful discussion ofalternative functional forms for labor supply
and theassocisted (in~irect utility function.
~In the interest ofcompleteness we note forthe readerthat (4) has slso been labeled in the literature
pseudo-Marshallian labor supply, intratemporal labor supply, within-period labor suPPIY. intratetnPoral
preferences equation, and within-period preferences equation.9
where ~-(1 t p)-~ is the subjective discount factor, r„a~, g(1- r,~, )r,t, is the after-tax
(net) real interest rate, and e~~~ is the forecast error between (1 t r,,,y,)A~, and its
expectation at time t. Taking natural logs, first differencing (5), and applying the
marginal utility of net wealth from the indirect utility function (3) the stochastic equation
we use to estimate intertemporal preferences is
aa01n Y,,, t~~ a~ A(Zt,,, InV,,, ) t AIn V,;, i. ir,,, - In e,,, , (tí)
where ~ In V,,, - ln V,,, - In Y, , D In V,;, - In(aV,,, I BA,,, ) - In(aV, I dA, ), and
K~~, -~~,, - p (Blomquist 1985; Blundell, Meghir, and Neves 1993).
3. Ecouometric Background
Cmss-section data are sufficient to identify intratemporal preferences parameters, A.
Identifying both intratemporal and intertemporal preferences requires either longitudinal
or repeated cross-section data. Panel data also facilitate modeling unobseurved worker
heterogeneity. Our sequential two-step econometric approach is first to estimate labor
supply conditioned on the starting and ending assets positions via equation (4). We then
substitute the estimated intratemporal preferences parameters into the marginal utility of
net wealth (6), treating first-stage parameter estimates as known constants. Finally, we
apply a consistently estimated asymptotic covariance matrix for sequential generalized
method-of-moments (GMM) estimators to correct for the fact that the standard errors of
the second-stage Euler equation (6) depend on first-stage standard errors (Newey 1984).
3.1 Step One: Estimating Intntempornl Preferences
In our first stage we allow the life-cycle consistent labor supply estimating equation
to include possible worker-specific latent heterogeneity
{ri - awf f rSAt-~ t Qv1r t XrY t r)r t~r ~ (~
where ~, is random ermr in hours worked at time t, which is assumed to be distributed as
iid (0,~). We treat the net wage and assets as endogenous because the marginal tax rate
depends on contemporaneous hours worked via eamings. Most importandy, the
time-invariant worker-specific labor supply heterogeneity, rt;, is generally not10
independent of the regressors because life~ycle wealth has person-specific influences. A
conunon econometric approach for handling endogenous worker heterogeneity is as a
nonstcehastic (fixed) effect. A populareconometric model for fixed effects is the within
estiatatoc A within estimator is inconsistent in a labor supply equation conditioned on
the net wage and lagged and current assets (7); the deviations from the individual
time-series means used as regressors in the within estimator will not be independent of
the overall labor supply errors, ~, because the tax rate depends on current hours worked.
The first-differences estimator we apply to labor supply (7) is consistent for a two-stage
rational expectations model such as ours (Keane and Runkle 1992).
The GMM Estimstoa Define the function g( P,D;A) as
g(P, D; A) - D'(Ah - PA) ~ D' ~, (8)
where P~[Aw, , AA,-, ,A~, , AX, ] is the (N(T -1) x L) matrix offirst-differenced
regressors in the estimated labor supply function in (Tj, D is an (N(T -1) x!i7 matrix
ofinstruments dated ~-1 and earlier, Ah is the (N(T -1) x 1) vector of first-differenced
hours worked, and A contains (L x 1) intratemporal preferences parameters to be
estimated. [a.a.4.Y]'.
The criterion function we minimize is
Jr(A) - 8(P.D; A)~5~8(P, D; A) , (9)
where S~ is an optimal weighting matrix, (D'E(A~~')D) . Initial consistent estimates
for the vector A~ come from aconsistent but sub-optimal weighting matrix, the identity
matrix. Solving the criterion function for the feasible generalized method-0f-moments
estimator gives
Á - [P'DS~D'P]-'P'DS~ D'eh , (10)
which has the estimated asymptotic covariance matrix
Var(A) - [P'DS~D'P]-~ .
Estimating labor supply via (8}{10) in first differences due to latent heterogeneity
and rational expectations creates an MA(1) process in the trattsformed random11
disturbance, ~, -~,-, , which influences the functional fotm ofthe weighting matrix, S~
(Maeshiro and Vali 1988). The weighting matrix in our GMM first-ditierences model,
S~, is the sum ofa conditionally heteroskedastic matrix ( f2o ) and an autocorrelation
matrix ( S2 ~) such that
S~ - Slo t(SZo t Sl; ], (12)
where
~o - (ll N(T -1))~;~,(~i,O~NA~á~w ), (13)
~, -(ll N(T-1))~,~,(~i,O~rA~;,-iDn-,), (14)
i- 1,..., N , and t - 1,..., T-1.8 Predetertnined infortnation dated t- 2 and earlier can
be instruments in light ofthe MA(1) errors in the first-differenced life-cycle consistent
labor supply (Griliches and Hausman 1986).
In addition to testing over-identifying restrictions some other specification tests are
prudent in step one. Motivated by previous research that has generally conditioned hours
worked on only concttrrent asset income or net (dis)saving, an obvious specification test
is a likelihood-ratio test ofwhether the additional lagged wealth tet~rt ( A,-, ) is
statistically significant in the estimated first-stage labor supply function. Specifically, we
wmpare J,.(A) in the unrestricted Iabor supply model (7) to J,.(A') in a restricted
model that conditions hours worked on the net wage and current virtual saving using the
statistic
LR - T(J,.(A') - J,.(A)] - X; . (15)
The degrees offreedom in the chi-squared statistic, S, is the number ofrestrictions
imposed (Newey and West 1987a). Because it is possible for the restricted criterion
function to be less than the unrestricted criterion function the test of the significance of
aWhenthe weighting matrix is not positive semidefinite we use a method ofmodified Bartlett weights
(Newey and West 1987b). We do notconfront the additional complexity that possible measurement errors
can introduce nonlinear random errors into the estimated indirect utility function, requiring a nonlinear
ertors-in-variables estimator in step two. Developing an inswmental variables estimator for nonlinear
errors in the variables ofour step two indirect utility function is beyond the scope of our research. For
examples of nonlinear errors in variables models sce Amemiya (1985, 1990) and Hsiao(1989).12
the Iabor supply effect ofIagged assets is asymptotically consistent in the positive
semidefinite sense if one uses the unrestricted weighting matrix (S~ ) in both
minimi7ations.
Our third specification test, which takes the same form as the likelihood-ratio test
statistic in (15), is a Hausman-type (exogeneity) test of the validity ofthe
contemporaneous gross wage rate as an instrument (Newey 1985). Remember that
exogeneity ofthe gross wage is a necessary condition for consistent estimation of labor
supply with taxes via maximum likelihood. Kejecting gross wage cxogcncity tells the
researcher to avoid the maximum-likelihood estimator popularized by Burtless and
Hausman (1978) and to follow instead an instrumental-variables approach such as we do.
3.2 Step 1tivo: Estimating Intertemponl Preferences
In step two we estimated intertemporal preferences parameters. The Euler equation
for the motion in the marginal utility ofnet wealth (6) defines the GMM criterion
funcdon for our second step estirnates that is
m(P,Z,M;A,O)s M'[QoAInY,.~ t~~o~A(Zt~.~InY,.~)tAlnY,a tir„~I. (16)
In the criterion equation (I 6) M is an ( N(T - 2) x Q) matrix ofinstruments, B is the
( K x 1) vector of intertemporal preferences parameters we estimate. The step two
criterion function we then minimize is
Jr.(~;A) - m(P,Z, M;A,~)'5,;,;,m(P,Z, M;A,O), (17)
where the weighting matrix in the criterion function (17), S~,m ~( M'(In êrtt In sft t) M) ,
is condítionally heteroskedastic. We obtain initial consistent estimates of the random
disturbance, Ins,,, , by setting the weighting matrix equal to the identity matrix.
Standard errors for the estimator ofintertemporal preferences ~may be 'ínconsistent
because they depend on first-stage standard errors. We use a consistently estimated
asymptotic covariance matrix of 0 that is13
~e -~mésw.me) ~ t[mémn~(Var(A)) ~mn~~me] ~
-{mé~mnBn~St. tS~acSn Imn~ ~me~ ~, (18)
where me , mn , and gn are partial derivatives, and S~ is the sample covariance between
g(.)and m(.) to comact for potential bias in thc second-stage standard errors of
estimated intertemporal preferences (Newey 1984).
33 Panmeterizing Taxes
The most influential econometric research on Iabor supply tax effects has applied
maximum likelihood to incorporate the piecewise-linear budget constraint (Burtless and
Hausman 1978; Hausman 1980, 1981a). Maximum likelihood rests on strong behavioral
assumptions: that a worker has complete knowledge of all tax brackets ex ante, that the
gross wage and gross nonwage income are exogenous to labor supply, and that the
Slutsky condition is satisfied at all intemal kink points of the budget constraint.
Exogeneity of the gross wage is unlikely, especially because the gross wage
researchers have used most often has been average hourly eamings. If hours worked are
measured with en-or then so is average hourly earnings, which then must be treated as
endogenous, violating an assumption ofmaximum likelihood. To ensure positive
probabilities and a well-behaved likelihood function maximum likelihood also regulates
the allowable set of labor supply responses, forcing a nonnegative estimated wage effect
and a nonpositive estimated asset income effect (MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch 1990;
Flood and MaCurdy 1992; MaCurdy 1992). Because ofits econometric complexity and
the stringent ex ante restrictions maximum likelihood places on estimated labor supply
parameters an altemative estimator such as the instrumental-variables approach we use is
attractive.
Diiferentiable Margieal Tax Rate. Because our estimator requires only information
on the etiective marginal tax rate it substantially eases the computation burden.
Specifically, because reported taxable income is relatively free of ineasurement error in14
the typical micro data set the marginal tax rate can be closely tracked by a difierentiable
polynomial in taxable income (MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch 1990; Rodgers, Brown, and
Duncan 1993). A differentiable marginal rate can also be integrated back to infer the
total taxes function needed to construct net wealth.
A diiierentiable roarginal tax rate approach to parameterizing net wages and nonwage
income easily accommodates the fact that social security taxes apply only to a portion of
eamings. Moreover, during our sample period most states had progressive income-tax
schedules where about thrce-fourths ofthe states used federal adjusted gross income or
federal taxable income as their bases. We judge the impact ofstate taxes as too important
to ignore while too complicated to represent exhaustively. Because we focus on how
federal income taxes affect life-cycle labor supply we augment the worker's federal
marginal tax and social security tax rates with an average state tax rate defined as the
ratio of individual state income tax collections to adjusted gross income in the state.
Algebraically, we adopt the total marginal tax rate specification
r, -[m~, -~z,lr~ f[~x, -ma,lb(!,)t~„T, tmr„rm, (19)
where r, is the average state tax rate, b(!~ is an estimated polynomial in taxable income
(1~), z- z„ f r~ with r~ the top federal marginal tax rate in year ~, and zw is the
payroll tax rate (MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch 1990). In the marginal tax rate in (19)
m~ [U~ - f~p )! QN ] ( j - 1,2,3 ) is the cumulative distribution function for the standard
nomial where mp is pseudo-spline function equal to 1 when l, ? pN and equal to ~.em
when !, ~ ErM . The speed at which a worker switches from one marginal tax bracket to
another is determined by aW , with greater smoothness produced by larger values of ow .
The parallel pseudo-spline function for social security taxes is ~~, [(fr~„ - Y, ) I a,,,],
where p,„ is the cutofffor the social security tax base, and Y~ is labor earnings. A
worker's marginal tax rate is then the state income tax rate, r.p , plus the federal marginal
tax rate and the social security tax rate when nonzero.15
The polynomial b(I~ in the tax function (19) approximates all of the marginal tax
brackets within a given range. In 1978, for example, there are 15 marginal tax brackets
between taxable incomes ofS3200 and 567,200. Taking S50 increments in incomes
53200 to 567,200 and calculating the associated statutory marginal tax rates in 1978
yields 1280 pairs of inwmes and mazginal tax rates. The cubic ordinary least squares
regression we ran through the 1280 marginal tax rate-income pairs to s~~mmAr;~~ the 1978
federal tax table for mamed couples filing jointly is
b(1,)-s„ t0.0402f(1.4410-')1, -(1.2110-'0)!? t(2.4910-'")l; . (20)
Figtue 1 illustrates how well the smooth tax function replicates the federal income tax
schedule exclusive ofthe average state and social security tax rates.9 [Insert Figure 1
here.]
The first year of our sample, 1978, provides an example of how the marginal tax
function (19) operates for a married couple filing jointly.~a The first term in the tax
functíon (19) reflects the zero bracket amount in the tax schedttle. For taxable income
above zero but less than 53200 Q)„ a 1, m2, - 0,~„ - 0, mm - 1, and the mazginal
tax rate is the state tax rate plus the payroll tax rate of6.05 percent. When taxable
income traches 53200 ~2, - 1, making the first term in (19) zero but adding the second
term so that the worker faced the marginal tax rate implied by the polynomial b(!~ in
(20). When taxable income reaches 567,200 m;, - 1, the second term in (19) vanishes,
and the effective marginal tax rate is the 1978 maximum federal rate of 55 percent, the
state income tax rate, plus the payroll tax rate if gross labor earnings were below S17,000.
4. Data
Our data are for 1978-1987 from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which is the
data set ttsed most frequently to study U.S. labor supply. The PSID is also the data from
91P7 - 0.98.
~cWe set the standard deviation, a„ to0.2 for each segmentj, which provides an a4equate degree of
curvature to the tax fundion according to MaCurdy, Green, and Pasrsch (1990).16
which much influential U.S. research on taxes and labor supply has drawn its samples
(Hausman 1981 a; MaCurdy, Crreen, and Paarsch 1990), making comparisons to our
results maximally infomiative. We selected our sample using multidimensional rules
símilar to others studying prime-aged male labor supply. Our sample is continuously
married, continuously working men who were ages 22 to 51 in 1978. The worker must
have been paid either an hourly wage rate or a salary; we deleted piece-rate workers and
the selfemployed. Our selection process yielded a balanced panel of532 prime-aged
U.S. men over 10 years, for 5320 person years of observations. The Appendix contains
summary statistics for all variables used in estimation.
4.1 Wsges
The Panel Study ofIncome Dynamics asks all workers how they are paid. For
workers paid by the hour the gross hourly wage rate is reconied. The interviewer asks
workers paid salaries how frequently they are paid, such as weekly, bi-weekly, or
monthly. The interviewer then norms a salaried worker's pay by a fixed number of hotus
depending on the pay period. For example, salary divided by 40 is the hourly wage rate
consttucted for a salaried worker paid weekly. The gross hourly wage rate we use is as
firee as possible ofthe division bias found in Iabor supply regressions using average
hourly eantings as the wage."
4.2 Ta:able Income
When constructing annual taxable income we assumed that the married men in our
sample filed joint tax rettuns. Adjusted gross income is the sum ofthe man's labor
eamings plus interest income. Taxable income is adjusted gross income less deductions
and exemptions. The Panel Study ofIncome Dynamics provides the number oftax
exemptions (dependents) taken in each year but calculating deductions required some
effort on our part.
"Forevidence on how tlrc gross wage measure affects Iabor supply perameterestimates see Conway and
Kniesner (1992, 1994).Computing the value ofdeductions depends on the year under consideration. To
evaluate deductions for years prior to and including 1983 we followed the convention
established in the PS[D. With information from the Internal Revenue Servicés Statistics
ofIncome we generated the typícal value of itemized deductions based on the man's
adjusted gross income. We then calculated the difierence between typical itemized
deductions and the standard deduction, known as excess itemized deductions. When
excess itemized deductions were positive we subtracted it from adjusted gross income;
when excess itemized deductions wero not positive we applied the standard deduction for
the years prior to and including 1983.
Beginning in 1984 the PSID records whether the family itemizecí. For knovm
itemizers we subtracted excess itemized deductions from adjusted gross income and used
the standard deduction for the men who did not itemize deductions for 1984 and
thereafter. One other small detail. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) the
standard deduction was built into the tax tables so that we only need subtract the value of
deductions exceeding the standard deduction from taxable income. After TRA86 came
into effect the standard deduction is no longer built into the tax tables so we subtracted
either the standard deduction or total itemized deductions from adjusted gross income
depending on whether the family itemized or not.
4.3 Asaets
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics has little information on interest rates, assets,
and saving. In estimating the Euler equation for the marginal utility of net wealth (6) we
use the after-tax annual average three-month T-Bill interest rate. We constructed assets
as the sum ofthe liquid and illiquid asset measures in the PSID. Liquid assets are
nominal rent, interest, and dividend income capitalized by a nominal interest rate. We
capitalized the first 5200 ofincome from liquid assets by the annual average passbook
savings account rate and capitalized rental income in excess of5200 per year by the
annual average three-month T-Bill rate. For the illiquid component of assets we used the18
value ofhome equity defined as the difference between hotue value and outstanding
principal remaining. Unlike previous resesrchets (Zeldes 1989, Runkle 1991) we
included illiquid assets because more wealth resides in home equity than in other liquid
components.1z In our sample almost 90 percent ofthe men are homeowners, but just over
halfthe men have liquid wealth. Because workers do not face their marginal tax rates for
all taxable income we added a capitalized lump-sum trartsfer to lagged wealth ( A,-, ),
creating virtual wealth. We adjusted lagged wealth because A,-, entets the cutrent
period's tax funetion. Our virtual wealth is a life-cycle model's analog to virtual income
in the static model oflabor supply with income taxes.13
5. Econometric Results
Our econometric appmach first estimates life-cycle consistent labor supply functions
to identify intratemporal preferences. In the coutse of our first step we address a number
ofspecification issues we believe have received insufficient attention. Specifically, in
step one we examine whether the cutrent wage (gmss and net) is exogenous, whether the
researcher need include common year-specific effects as well as worker-specific effects,
whether the patameter estimates are sensitive to how one meastues the rate ofpay, and
whether the budget consttaint is time (non)separable. In step two we estimate
intertemporal preference parameters conditional on the econometrically dominant
intratemporal preference parameters estimated in step one. When estimating the
intertemporal preferences in step two via the intertemporal Euler equation we are again
~ZThe PSID collected comprehensive wealth data in 1984 and 1989, including data on house equity, net
value ofother real estate, net value ofvehicles, net value ofa farm or other business, and net value ofother
assets. The measure oftotal weahh from the PSID has been used by others (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes
1994, 1995). Ziliak (1994) demonstrates that variation in our measuro of liquid wealth explains about half
the variation in total wealth while including home equity makes variation in our measure of wealth explain
80 percent oftotal wealth. The ability ofour wealth measure to track total wealth when measured
independently is ourjustification for including both liquid and illiquid weahh measures in our definition of
wealth. Our sttmmary wealth statistics are comparable to wealth measures from the Survey ofIncome and
Program Participation (Engen, Gale, and Scholz 1994).
13Virtual weahh is the sum of Iagged wealth plus the capitalized value ofthe lump-sum transfer so that
virtual wealth is A,-, t[(r(~,1 - T(I.III~ Nj~r, where r, is the nominal annual average ofthe 3-month T-bill
nste. In all regressions in Table 2 we tue net saving plus the uncapitalized lump-sum transfer.19
interested in the importance of possible economy-wide shoclt3 as well as possible person-
specific discount rate heterogeneity. Part of step two is a test ofthe underlying rational
expectations hypothesis using an ancillary equation for updating the marginal utility of
net wealth. Finally, we use our estimates of intra and intertemporal preferences for
prime-age men to compute the lifetime indirect utility function plus the wage and tax
elasticities oflabor supply with respect to tn~nsitory versus permanent and expected
versus unexpected net real wage changes. Our indirect utility function and labor supply
elastícity estimates are the foundadon of simulations of the behavioral responses to and
welfare effects ofrecent U.S. tax policies in Section 6.
5.1 Step One: Eatimating Iotntemporsl Preferenees
We estimate intratemporal preferences using equation (7), life-cycle consistent Iabor
supply with worker-specific heterogeneity. All regressions condition on demographics
usually included in econometric models oflabor supplied - age, health status, and
number ofchildren living at home. As explained in Section 3 our maintained hypothesis
ofrational expectations leads us to an approach common in estimation with panel data
when there are worker-specific fixed effects, the first-ditierence transformation.
We generate inidal parameter estimates by choosing the identity matrix as the initial
weighting matrix, which is a consistent insttumental-variables estimator. Residuals from
initial IV regressions form the weighting matrix for GMM estimates.
Basic Instrument Set. The instrument sets for estimating intratemporal preferences
in step one date t-I and t-2. There are 20 instruments in the basic instrument set in step
one: a constant; values at t-I and t-2 of age, age2, (age~education), number ofchildren,
health status (- 1 ifdisabled), union status (- 1 ifinember), and home ownership; and
values at t-2 ofthe gross real wage, the net real wage, the net three-month T-Bill rate, net
real wealth, and net real virtual wealth.
We chose otu instruments for all steps of estimation based on multiple criteria. One
requirement was parsimony and similarity to previous empirical labor supply research.20
More important is that instruments must all be exogenous, which we verified with an LR
test. We did not, however, use the lazgest possible instnunent set by exploiting extreme
nonlinearities or all possible moment conditions as discussed in Ahn, Lee, and Schmidt
(1994). We also did not attempt to choose an instnunent set that maximizes a measure of
fit between instruments and the set of endogenous regressors or maximizes efficiency
conditional on consistency as discussed in Hall (1993) and Newey and McFadden (1994).
Speciíication Checks. We examine the econometric consequences ofhow one
measures the wage rate by running parallel specifications using average howly earnings
versus the reported howly wage. We use a Hausman-type testing approach to the issue of
the exogeneity of the current gross wage by numing regressions with and without the
current gross wage in the instrument set. Finally, we also estimate regressions where we
append time (year-specific) dummy variables to the basic instrument set because the
validity of time dummies is important for the consistency of GMM estimation in rational
expectations models because year-specific effects will captwe forecast enors from
common economy-wide disturbances (Chamberlain 1984, p. I 311).
Table 1 pn~ents six fixed-effects labor supply estimates conditioning on current and
lagged assets, and Table 2 presents six fixed-effects labor supply regressions conditioning
on current virtual saving. Comparisons ofroegressions across the columns within either
Table 1 or Table 2 indicate the econometric consequences of(1) possible economy-wide
forecast errors, (2) the wage measwe, and (3) nonexogeneity ofthe current gross wage.
The difference between results in Tables I and 2 reveals time (non)separability in the
lifetime budget constraint. [Insert Tables 1 and 2 here.]
Step One Resulta. Important for how best to estimate labor supply tax effects is the
change in the estimated wage ccefficient when we appended the contemporaneous gross
howly wage to the instnunent set. Both the uncompensated and compensated wage
elasticities are significantly negative in column (2) of Table 1 suggesting
downwazd-sloping uncompensated and compensated labor supply schedules, which21
violates the Slutsky integrability conditions. Becatue the p-value for the LR test
comparing the regressions in coltunns (1) aad (2) ofTable 1 is 0.015 the data reject the
extra over-identifying restriction imposed by adding the gross wage to the instrument set
in what we will emphasize is the prefetred case of the observed hourly wage regressor.
(Similarly, the data reject the validity of the current gross wage as an insttvment with ap-
value of 0.008 in the case ofthe expanded insttument set with time dtunmies.) Rejecting
the contempotaneous gross wage as a valid insttvment supports otu
instrumental-variables approach to estimation over maximum likelihood, which requires
gross wage rate exogeneity.~'
Both cutrent and Iagged assets have estitnated coefficients producing negative labor
supply wealth effects in Table 1. However, the estimated (unkompensated labor supply
wage effect is significantly positive only when the instrument set correctly includes time
dtunmies (p - 0.088), properly excludes the contemporaneous gross wage, and uses as the
wage the more acctuately measured repotted hotuly rate of pay. The corresponding
estimated marginal tax elasticity in coltmut (3) ofTable l, found by differentiating the
Iabor supply function with respect to the marginal tax rate, is negative so that hotus of
work decline with increases in marginal tax rates. Recall that a finding common in the
static labor supply literature is a downward sloping or vertical uncompensated labor
supply function for men, possibly due to using average hourly earnings as the wage
regressor (Conway and Kniesncr 1992, 1994), which is the case in thc results presented in
columns 4-6. Not only dces the more negative estimated coefficient ofaverage hotuly
~'Appending the contemporaneous gross average hourly eamings to the instrument set in column (4) of
Table I has less effect on the estimated wage coefficient because tfie wage elasticities are insignificantly
negative. Compering the J-statistics ofcolumns (4) and (5) highlighu the problem noted by Newey and
West (1987a) that the restricted model may have a lower computed J-statistic. Using the unrcstricted
covariance matrix with restrided rcsiduals and common instruments yields a LR test statistic of 4. I 1 with a
p-value of0.043 at one degree offreedom, suggestinga weaker rcjection ofIhe concurrenl gross average
hourlyearnings as a valid inslrument. Wi[h time dummies in thc instrument set thc LH test statistic for
rcjecting gross average hourly eamings exogeneiry is 335.76 (p - 0.000). For completeness we also note
that the data rcject exogeneiry ofthe current netwage with, for example, ap-value ofo.004 in the case of
the rcported hourly wage and time dummies in the instrument set in Table I.22
eamings in Table 1 suggest wage coefficient division bias (Borjas 1980), but the
goodness-of-fit (.~ statistic also favors the model with the reported wage in column (3) of
Table 1 over the regression model with average hourly eamings in coltunn (6).
As brought out in Section 2 a time-separable life-cycle Iabor supply model may
condition hours worked on cutrent net saving. Table 2 presents analog labor supply
regressions to Table 1 collapsing cturent and lagged assets into net virtual saving,
S1 ~ Ar -(1 f r„~)At-1 f Lr, where Lr is the lump-sum transfer needed to create virtual
saving ( L, x: [(z(1, )- T(I, ) I I, )~I,]), which is a sufficient statistic for extra-sample
period information under time separability (MaCurdy 1983; Blundell, Meghir, and Neves
1993). Unlike Table 1 the estimated wage cce~cient is negative in Table 2 whether the
gross wage or time dummies are excluded from (included in) the instrument set for the
reported hourly wage.~s The net saving coefficient has the ex ante expected negative sign
in Table 2. The overidentifying restrictions do not favor the models using time dtunmies
as insttutttents in Table 2, which may reflect the fact that net saving dces not adequately
capture aggregate shocks to labor supply while the model in Table 1 dces.
Perhaps most important for step two to follow is that the intertemporally nonseparable
model in column (3) ofTable 1, life-cycle consistent labor supply estimated with the
reported wage and including time dummies but omitting the gross wage from the
instnunent set, econometrically dominates (is not rejected in favor of) the time-separable
models in Table 2. In pardcular, no regression model in Table 2 has thejointly required
significantly negative saving effect and significantly positive compensated wage effect.
From tests of instnunent exogeneity and intertemporal nonseparability (LR - 9.845 with
p- 0.002 for rejection ofthe null hypothesis that budgets are time separable) we select
~SThe negativewage ecetiieient in the net saving models appears under a variety of instrument set choices
including instrument sets without lagged endogenous variables (containing only demographics). The
suboptimal 2SLS wage coefïicient is positive and insignificant. The difference between (untabulated)
2SLS coefficients and the GMM results in Table 2 can stem from a negative correlazion between the
weight matrix and the rcgressors (Altonji and Segal 1994). A possible downward bias due to a correlation
between the weight matrix and regressors does not occur in the GMM nonseparable models in Table 1.23
column (3) of Table 1 for the estimated labor supply parameters to use in step two
regressions and in the simulations of Section 6 calculating the Iabor market and welfare
effects ofrecent tax regime changes.
Quality of the Instrument Set. An important line ofrecent econometric research has
been to examine [V estimation when the instruments are weakly related to the associated
endogenous explanatory variable. The two consequences of weak instruments (for
example, RZ 5 0.05 betwcen a single explanatory variable and the instruments) are large
inconsistencies in IV parameter estimates even ifthe correlation betwcen the instruments
and the structural equation error is small and IV parameter estimates that are biased in the
direction of OLS even in large samples (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995). The practical
implication is that when applying instnunental variable estimation one should not only
test whether the over-identifying restrictions hold but also examine and report
information summarizing the strength of the instrument set. In a case such as our GMM
approach where there is a Iarge instrument set and multiple endogenous explanatory
variables Bowden and Turkington (1984, Chapter 2) recommend reporting canonical
correlation of endogenous regressors and instruments. We dutifully report that the
geometric mean ofthe canonical correlations between the regressors and the instrument
set for our most preferred specification, column (3) ofTable 1, is 0.387 so that we should
not have the problems associated with weak instruments in our model of choice.~b
Summsry and Implicationa of Step One. Step one estimates ofintratemporal
preferences establish that the contemporaneous gross hourly wage is not exogenous to the
estimated labor supply function, which agrees with the static results from Flood and
MaCurdy (1992) and conflicts with the econometric assumptions required for
maximum-likelihood estimation of labor supply tax effects. We also found that
16As another pointof reference to use in supporting ourGMM results we note that the biased and
inefficiently estimatedOLS coefficients (standard errors) for our prcferred specification, column (3) of
Table I, arc a --37.7224 (3.3779), S- 0.0185 (0.1192), and 4--0.3819 (0. I 138).24
intertemporally nonseparable models with cutrent and lagged assets dominate
time-separable life-cycle consistent labor supply models. Using our most prefen-ed
results in step one, coltunn (3) ofTable 1, the mean estimated uncompensated wage
elasticity is about 0.13 and the mean estimated compensated wage elasticity is 0.14 to
0.15. The estimated tax elasticity oflabor supply is -0.06, so that hours worked by
prime-aged men would fall slightly more than one-half percent in the short run with a]0
percent increase in U.S. marginal tax rates.
5.2 Step Two: EatimAting Intertemporal Preferences
The previous section showed that the most appropriate estimated parameters from
step one to use in step two come from GMM fixed-effects labor supply estimates with
reported wages and conditioning on ctrrrent and lagged assets. Treating the estimated
labor supply parameters as known when estimating the empirical Euler equation for the
marginal utility ofnet wealth (6) we can then identify intertemporal preferences,
including the subjective discotmt rate, p, and the coefficients ofrelative risk aversion,
ak , which are components of the long-run (life-cycle) labor supply elasticities. The
embedded risk-aversion equation has a constant term plus (changes in) wealth, in the
number ofchildren living at home, and in health status.
We tued a basic instrument set with 20 instruments in the GMM estimator in step
two: a constant; gross and net reported wages, the net 3-month T-bill rate; children, age,
agé, the interaction ofage and education, health status, and home ownership in years t-3
and t~; plus net wealth in year t-4. Euler equation estimates from step two appear in
Table 3. As in step one we examine the importance of adding time dummies to the
instrtunent set in columns (2) and (4).~~ [Insert Table 3 here.]
We estimated four specifications of the intertemporal Euler equation, a common
discount rate versus person-specific discount rate with and without time dummies in the
~~The geometric mean canonical correlation between the endogenous regressors and the instrument set
with time dummies in step two is 0.175.zs
instrument set. In the interest ofspace and because the subjective discount rate seems
unlikely to be constant across workers but rather likely to capture heterogeneity of
intertemporal preferences we will only discuss the person-specific discount rate
specifications ofTable 3. The overidentifying restrictions are satisfied and the
heterogeneous discount rate specification in coltunns (3) and (4) dominate the common
discount rate specification in columns (1) and (2).1e Because the heterogeneous life-cycle
consistent labor supply specification dominated a homogeneous life-cycle consistent
labor supply specification it is not surprising that a specification check in step two also
locates discount rate heterogeneity.
The mean value ofthe estimated person-specific discount rates is 0.034, which is at
the upper end ofthe range ofestimates in the consumption literature (Hansen and
Singleton 1982, Deaton 1992). The estimated constant ccefficient of relative risk
preferences, vp, is positive but less than unity, indicating risk aversion in the prefen-ed
specifications ofcolumns (3) and (4) ofTable 3. Risk aversion increases with wealth and
poor health as the estimated values of o~ and eTy are both positive.
Uecertaiety aed the Ratioeal-Eipectatioes Hypothesu. The econometric labor
supply model we use has the rational-expectations ofuncertain economic outcomes,
which implies that past forecast errors do not influence ctm~ent decisions or cause
revisions in the marginal utility ofnet wealth. Ifour underlying model cotTectly specifies
the evolution oflife-cycle labor supply only contemporaneous innovations to components
of wealth should cause revisions in the marginal utility of net wealth.
Because the residual from the Euler equation (6) is the innovation to the mazginal
utility ofnet wealth In ê,,, can function as the dependent variable in a test of the
underlying rational expectations hypothesis and in estimating Iabor supply elasticities
with respect to unexpected transitory wage changes. Specifically, let
'BUsing the LR test (~~ N-1 - s31) the impliedp-values under the null hypothesis ofa common
discount rate for the basic and expanded instrumentset with time dummies arc both 0.000.26
Inê,.~-~a,(~,.~-E,~,.~)f~a(..,,~-E,Á,.~)t~U(A,.~-E,A,.~). (21)
where E, indicates expectation at time t. Under rational expectations lagged innovations
should have no additional predictive power when estimating equation (21), SE„ and a;u
should be negative, and Sv can take either sign or zero (Altonji and Ham 1990).
Because intettemporally nonseparable budgets make the lagged crror at t-1
endogenous, the appropriate comparison is between the fit ofthe models including
(omitting) Inê,-, in the instrument set.
Following the lead ofAltonji and Ham (1990) we estimated a semi-logarithmic Euler
equation for the marginal utility of net wealth (21) in two steps.19 Using instruments
dated t- j(j ? 2) we first produced time t expectations of period ttl's net wage, net
interest rate, and net wealth. Using inshvments dated t- k(k ? 1) we then estimated the
arguments on the right-hand side of (21), which are the innovations in period t's expected
net wage, net interest rate, and net wealth.
In both steps involved in estimating the ancillary equation (21) there were 20
instnunents including a constant plus the values at t-1, I-2, and t3 ofnet assets, children
at home, health status, the net three-month T-bill rate, and age and values at t-2 and t-3
ofgross and net wages. For completeness we again examined the econometric
consequences of allowing ewnomy-wide shocks by including time dummies in the
insttwnent set in halfthe estimated Euler equations.
Because the over-identifying restrictions on the ancillary regressions presented in
Table 4 are not as readily accepted as in the cases of labor supply and the indirect utility
fnnction, a limited-information approach seems best. Practically speaking, both
specifications where the innovations at t2 are excluded from the instntment set, rows (1)
and (3), give comparable economic results. All three regressors have the expected a
priori signs, and the interest rate and wealth innovations' coefficíents are statistically
197'he two steps arc necessary because the standard econometric approach to rational expectations results in
a matrix ofexplanatory variables that is singular here.27
significant at the one percent level while the wage innovation coefiicient is significant at
the five percent level in row (3). Unexpected increases in wages or wealth diminish
marginal utility while unexpected increases in the interest rate raise the marginal utility of
net wealth. The dominance ofthe specifications in rows (1) and (3) ofTable 4 based on
theirp-values also means that we reject the Iagged forecast error at time t2 as a valid
instrument and do not to reject the null hypothesis of rational expectations. [Insert Table
4 here.]
53 Labor Supply Elaaticitiea
Because of its relevance to economic policy a focal point of the empirical literature on
life-cycle labor supply has been the .i-constant elasticity, which is the labor supply
response to an expected wage change. The .ï-constant labor supply elasticity can be
computed from the intertemporal substitution elasticity (ISE), which is the Iabor supply
response to an expected change in all prices (Browning I985). The .i-constant elasticity,
also known as Frisch's specific-substitution elasticity, is e,, -[e„ t`Y(e,, )Z (wh I A)],
where e„ is the compensated wage elasticity, Y'is the ISE, eA is the wealth elasticity, and
(widA) is current eamings relative to wealth. The sample mean ~.-constant elasticity in
Table 3 is about 0.15 in both the common and worker-specific discount rate
specífications. As n~uired by the assumption of strictly concave preferences the
~-constant elasticity in Table 3 is larger than the compensated wage elasticity in column
(3) ofTable 1, which is larger than the uncompensated wage elasticity in column (3) of
Table 1.
To understand how estimated labor supply elasticities vary importantly across
families Table 5 presents six elasticities of interest by wealth quartile. Notice that the
(unkompensated and ~-constant elasticities rise with wealth so that the hours response to
wage changes are about 50 percent larger for the wealthiest 25 percent compared to the
poorest 25 percent of prime-aged men. Examining only elasticity averages in Table l
would also obscure the distributional consequences oftax policy. As wealth increases so2s
does workers' responsiveness to taxation so that the marginal tax rate elasticity doubles as
one moves from the lowest to the highest wealth quartiles in Table S.ZO We retum to the
issue of wealth and its interaction with tax reforms in the next section. [Insert Table 5
here.]
The last elasticity we mention in Table 5 has some interest for macro labor
economists. The mean difierence between realized and expected wages is about 0.233.
Using the wage coefïicient from row (3) ofTable 4 the wealth effect ofan unanticipated
wage change is then (-0.13 x 0.233) a-0.03, and the average labor supply elasticity of an
unanticipated wage change is approximately (0.15 - 0.03) - 0.12. The uncertainty
component or macro element ofthe total labor supply response to an unanticipated cyclic
wage change is nontrivial in the highest wealth quartile, however. The wealth effect that
accompanies an unexpected wage change shrinks the labor supply response ofthe
wealthiest quartile ofworkers by about eight percent compared to an expected wage
change. The increasing wealth effect across wealth quartiles standardizes the total
elasticity oflabor supplied with respect to an unexpected wage change at about 0.10 for
all wealth quartiles.
6. Implicatioos for Taz Poliey
In applying the economic literature on the welfare costs of(non)linear income and
commodity taxes we use the estimated intra and interperiod preferences discussed in
Section 5 to form the indirect utility function and the associated expenditure function,
É[oi, ,Y, (ui, , A,-, , A, )] , which we then use in so-called exact measures ofchanges in
economic well being. We examine two measures of welfare change in the United States
due to recent changes in the income tax laws.
20A clarifying point. By construction our elasticity calculations are a positive function of(u.vh), which on
average is 40 percent higher in the highest wealth quartile than in the lowest wealth quartile. However, the
partial derivativeof labor supplied with respect to the marginal tax rate is not the same across workers and
the marginal tax rate elasticity of labor supplied differs by 100 percent between the lowest and highest
wealth quartiles.29
6.1 Deadweigàt Loaa Meaaures '
One measure ofwelfare change we calculated with our estimated preferences
parameters is a hypothetical payment to the govemment by the typical prime-aged
married male worker under the pre tax-reform (wage and capital) income that would
leave welfare unchanged under the post tax-reform income (Kay 1980). The hypothetical
payment, or equivalent variation measure, compares an initial distorted equilibrium with
a final distorted equilibrium and is ofthe form
D(EV) - E[~:,Vz(~:,A„Az -TzN-E[~~.Vz(~:,A„Az -Tz)]
-Tz(Wiiti,rzA„D2,FxZ)tT(Wh„r,Ao,D„Ex,), (22)
where m, and u~z are the pre and post reform net marginal wage rates; A~ and A1 are pre
and post-reform assets; and T, ( t- 1,2 ) is the value ofactual tax payments at pre and
post-reform levels, which depend on gmss labor eamings (Wlh~), interest income (rr,4~-~),
deductions (D~), and exemptions (Ex~). The deadweight loss measure in (22) is a
consistent ordinal indicator ofwelfare in that a beneficial tax refortn leaving tax
payments constant reduces D(E[~ (Auerbach 1985).
The equivalent variation measure in (22) fixes utility at its post-reform level, which
under joint nonlinear income taxation is a function ofpost-reform wage and pre and post-
reform assets, and lets wage differences imply a change in worker well being across tax
regimes. An altemative calculation uses the change in consumers' surplus, called welfare
variation, where the wage vector is held at a reference level, such as the pre tax-reform
level, and utility differs when taxes change (King 1983, Triest 1987). The welfare
variation measure ofmoving from one distorted equilibrium to another is
D(WV) - É[W,V,(tu,,Aa,A, -T,)]-É[W,Vz(cuz,A,,Az -Tz)]
-Tz(Wzhz.rzA,.D„Exz)tT(Wihi~riAo~Di~~i)~ (23)
where the reference point is the gross wage, W. Joint nonlinear taxation ties the periods
together by making V? depend on pre and post-reform wealth. The deadweight loss
measure in (23) is the change in consumer utility less the actual revenue extracted. As30
long as the reference price vector is fixed across altematives the welfare variation
measure is a consistent ordinal measure ofutility such that any revenue neutral tax
change that raises utility, V~~V2, will reduce D(WT~.
Although the ordinal rankings ofthe equivalent variation and welfare variation
measures may differ unless the initial tax vector is applied to goods with zero income
elasticities, both measures will give similar ordinal rankings under revenue neutral tax
changes (Triest 1987).
6.2 Ts: SimnlaHon Detaib
In addition to simulating changes in economic well being we also simulated the labor
supply responses to four federal income tax reforms. Because the system we estimated in
Section 5 is a nonlinear function ofthe income tax schedule the marginal tax rate is
endogenously determined with hours worked.21 We then applied numerical methods to
solve for the endogenous variables.
The nonlinear simultaneous equations system we solved describes labor supplied,
wealth accumulation, the marginal tax rate, and tax payments as
hrr - 27B3 12Wr(I - zit )-0.4941Arr-t - 2.0278Air t XirY t rl; t ~rr~ (24)
~rr -li t r(I - zir))~it-1 t ~r(I - zir)~ir -Cir - T(~ir)~ (25)
zu - ~m1ir -m2ir~lu) f ~2uzair~ and (26)
T(1ir)- Jz(~ir~rr~ (27)
where C„ is consumption, q, , is the estimated person-specific fixed effect, and z;, is the
nonlinear marginal tax rate that depends on hours worked and assets.
Z~To be consistent with past research our structural simulation model takes the spouses' Iabor supply
decisions es sequential wherein the husband first chooses his labor supply subject to a marginal tax rate
calculated at wife's earnings ofzero. In the sequential decision making underlying our labor supply
simulations the wife's labor and interest incomes do notcontribute to the husband's marginal tax rate
calculations used in planning. We have, however, experimented by adding the wife's labor earnings to
virtual saving in the models in Table 2 with no change in our conclusions using either the smooth marginal
tax rates or the marginal tax rates reported in the PSID.31
We solved the system in (24}-(27) via backwazd induction using the Gauss-Newton
algorithm and 100 Monte Carlo draws for each of the 532 men from the distribution
~- N(0,Q~ - 458) where 458 is the estimated standard deviation ofthe error in the
first-differences model in Table 1, column (3).z2 We then used simulated values in
deadweight loss calculations of fotu tax regime changes.
6.3 Four Tax Regime Changes
We calculated measures ofthe comparative welfare etiects of four U.S. federal tax
regimes. In particular, we examined (1) the 1987 (post-TRA86) U.S. income tax
structure versus a regime where taxes are absent, (2) the 1987 U.S. income tax structure
versus a 10 percent across-the-boazd rate cut, (3) the 1987 income tax rates versus the
1981 (pre-ERTA) income tax regime, and (4) the 1987 income tax rates and tax base
versus the pre-ERTA income tax regime.
Because our tax experiments refer to tax cuts our deadweight loss calculations are the
maximum amounts the typical prime-aged married male worker would pay to lower his
taxes. In all four cases the equivalent-variation (22) and welfare change (23) meastues
are close, differing no more than one percent, and giving consistent ordinal rankings of
welfare changes. The particulaz tax reform and the worker's location in the wealth
distribution determines labor supply with the greatest labor supply response coming from
the wealthiest workers.
Elimiuating Iucome Taxes. Estimates presented in Table 6 show that eliminating
income taxes would lead prime-aged married men to work about four percent more hours
on average, which is an estimate that is 60 percent larger than Triest (1990) who used a
static labor supply model. Workers in the upper quartile ofthe wealth distribution would
supply about seven percent more hours. The typical U.S. prime-aged mazried male
worker would pay up to about 23 percent ofhis adjusted gross income to eliminate the
ZZTripling the number ofMonte Cazlo draws changed the simulated values by no more than one percent.32
cutTertt progressive income taxation.~ By additional comparison Hausman's (1981 b)
widely cited estimated labor supply effects ofremoving income taxes are higher (about
eight percent) and estimated willingness to pay much lower (two percent) than our
estimates. To explain, Hausman's Iabor supply income tax efiects are driven by a lazge
income effect whereas our deadweight loss calculations reflect a larger lifetime
substitution effect. By adding capital income taxation to a life-cycle model including
worker hettrogeneity and time nonseparable utility we have located a gr~eater extent ofthe
excess burden ofincome taxes than Hausman located using a time-separable static model
estimated with a single cross-section ofthe Panel Study of Income Dynamics. [Insert
Table 6 here.]
An Acrose-the-Board Rate Cut. A 10 percent across-the-board rate cut from the
cun~ent tax structute would cause about a 0.6 percent increase in the labor supplied
annually by prime-aged married men (about 13 hours) accompanied by a reduction in
govtmment tax revenues ofabout six percent. Our typical married male worker would
pay one to two percent ofadjusted gross income to have a 10 percent cut while the
wealthiest 25 petcent wou(d pay two to three percent ofAGI for a 10 perr,ent reduction in
income tax rates.
TRA86 Rate Cuts. Results from our third calculation, comparing the labor supply
n.,sponse and deadweight loss from moving from the pre-ERTA (1981) income tax
regime to the post-TRA86 (1987) income tax rates reveals that the average prime-aged
married man nused hours supplied by two percent and would have paid 11 per~cent ofhis
adjusted gross income for the change to TRA86 tax rates. Our estimates are that the
wealthiest workers increased their labor supplied by about four percent and had about a
2~We used the traditional Kay and King measures ofdeadweight loss here because the welfare effects of
eliminating the current federal income tax compare a distorted initial equilibrium to an undistorted final
equilibrium.33
14 percent improvement in their economic well being due to taxes under TRA86
compared to the pre-ERTA tax regime.
TRA86 Rate and Base Cuts. [n our fotuth simulation in Table 6 we compare the
labor supply and deadweight loss response from moving from the pre-ERTA (1981)
income tax regime to the post-TRA86 (1987) income tax rates and tax base. TRA86 took
over six million people offthe tax rolls so that incorporating both tax rate and base
changes should make the simulated hours resportse higher than when incorporating only
the tax rate changes under TRA86. Table 6 shows a 2-5 percent increase in labor
supplied across the four quartiles in case (4), our simulation ofthe dual effects ofthe rate
and base changes under TRA86.24 Comparing cases (3) and (4) implies the tax base
effect ofTRA86. Table 6 implies that changes in the tax base under TRA86 increased
both average labor supplied and the welfare improvement under TRA86 by about an
additional 50 percent with the largest effects occurring as expected in the lowest two
wealth quartiles.
7. Conclusion
Our research has developed a structural model of life-cycle labor supply ofworkers
facing a nonlinear tax structure over both wage and interest incomes, which generates an
intertemporally nonseparable budget constraint and labor supply function. We included
intertemporal nonseparability econometrically by estimating a life-cycle consistent labor
supply equation that is conditioned on start-of-period and end-of-period assets. With data
for prime-aged men for 1978-1987 from the Panel Study ofIncome Dynamics and a
smoothed nonlinear intertemporal net budget constraint in a two-step generalized
method-of-moments estimator we first identified intraperiod then interperiod-preferences
parameters.
Z4As a benchmark to use injudging labor supply simulations actual average hours worked increased by
three to four percent during 1981-1987 for prime-aged men.34
Our GMM estimator admitted comparisons of permanent versus transitory and
expected versus unexpected wage changes so that we could develop labor supply
elasticities of interest to both micro and macro economists. Estimates rejected labor
supply models with intertemporally separable budget constcaints in favor of
intertemporally nonseparable labor supply. We used our labor supply estimates in
stcehastic simulations ofthe welfare gains from recent tax refomzs that produced a flatter
income tax system in the United States. Our results emphasize that the study ofthe
work-incendve effxts ofincome taxation should use longitudinal data, which pertnit
incorporating the empirical realism oflatent worker heterogeneity and time nonseparable
decisions due to joint nonlinear taxation ofwage and nonwage incomes.
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N- 5320. All wealth, price, income vaziables aze in real terms witó
respect to the 1987 personal consumption expenditure deflator.
Liquid assets equal nominal interest, dividend, and rental income earnings
with the first 3200 deflated by the average annual passbook saving rate and
thc remainder deflated by tbe average annual 3amontó T-Bill rate.Figure 1: Statutory and Differential
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70 IIOTabk l Life-Cyck Comisteat Labor Supply Equation: Time Nonxparabk Model witó A,.,, A,'
Varisbk Reported Hotuly Wage Average Hourly F.arninga
(1) (2) (3) (4)
v,(~) 24.bSS6 -24.9649 27.8312 -16.5966
(ZO.bSSS) (6.t268)rrr (14.9042)r (10.1754)
A,.,(8) -0.3698 -0.3818 -0.4941 -0.3983
(51000's) (0.1905)r (0.1796)r' (0.2267)rr (O.1727)rr
A,(~) -1.6211 -0.0283 -2.0278 -0.5478









Wage 0.1153 -0.1167 0.1301 -0.0832 -0.0481 -0.0408
Elasticity" (0.0966) (0.0286)'rr (0.0697)r (O.OSIO) (0.0429) (0.0438)
1868ed
Wealth -0.0100 -0.0103 -0.0135 -0.0108 -0.0087 -0.0151
Elaaticity (O.OOS2)r (0.0049)rr (0.0062)rr (0.0047)rr (0.0060) (O.OOSS)rrr
Current
Wealtó -0.0468 -0.0008 -0.OS86 -0.0158 -0.0150 -0.0363
Elaaticiry (0.0235)rr (0.0139) (0.0227)rrr (0.0196) (0.0299) (0.0186)r'
Comp. Wage
(A,.,) 0.1190 -0.1128 0.1351 -0.0788 -0.0446 -0.0352
Elastkity (0.0966) (0.0287)'r' (0.0697)r (0.0510) (0.0430) (0.0439)
Comp. Wage
(AJ Elaaticity 0.1318 -0.1164 0.1508 -0.0772 -0.0424 -0.0279
(0.0969) (0.0292)'r' (0.0701)r' (0.0515) (0.0444) (0.0443)
MTR
Elasticity` -0.OSO4 0.0511 -0.0567 0.0364 0.0211 0.0179
(0.0423) (0.0123)rrr (0.0305)r (0.0223) (0.0188) (0.0192)
J-Statistic"
d.o.f. 18.6825 21.1878 23.9234 20.0721 16.5671 27.9624
[~valueJ 14 IS 20 !4 IS 20
[0.1774J [0.1309] [0.2458] (0.1279] (0.3454] [0.1103]
' Standard errors are in parentiieses. Columns (2) and (4) contain the gtou wage as an additional instrument
while columns (3) and (b) contain time dummies aa instruments.
e Elaaticities are computed at their mean valuea: rct reported wage L 10.19; net average hourly earnings -
10.93; A,., - 59.332; A, - 62.969;h, - 2179.48; MTR - 0.2979.
' MTR elasticity - (-eW, - ~MTRJ x (MTR~hJ.
a d.o.f. is the number of ic~sttwnents less parametero estimated and the p-value is for the mill hypothesis that
the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected.
r, rr, rrr denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1 pett;ent kvels, respcctively.Table 2 LifeLj~ck Coroisteot l~bor Supply Equation: Time Separabk Model with S;
Variable Reported Hourly Wage Average Hour1Y Earnings
(1) (Z) (3) (4) (S) (6)
w,(a) -24.8865 -26.4032 -50.3075 -33.3578 6.4968 -84.4164
(12.0730)rr (6.1843)rrr (8.1795)rsr (7.3383)rrr (8.3791) (3.507g)rrr
S,(~) -0.2406 -0.2323 -0.3394 -0.2511 -0.0519 -0.6718
(51000's) (0.0454)rrr (0.0454)rrr (0.0230)rrr (0.0411)rrr (0.0544) (0.0316)rrr
Uncomp. -0.1163 -0.1234 -0.2352 -0.1672 0.0326 -0.4232
Wage (0.0564)rr (0.0289)rsr (0.0382)rrr (0.0368)rrr (0.0420) (0.0176)rrr
Elasticity~
Saviog -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.OOOS -0.0004 -0.OOOI -0.0010
Elasticity (0.0001)rrr (0.0001)rrr (3.3E-5)rrr (0.0001)rrr (0.0001) (4.9E-5)'rr
Comp. Wage -0.1139 -0.1210 -0.2317 -0.1645 0.0331 -0.4158
(SJ Elasticity (0.0564)rr (0.0289)rrr (0.0382)rrr (0.0368)rrr (0.0420) (0.0176)rrr
MTR 0.0509 0.0541 0.1030 0.0731 -0.0142 0.1850
Elaaticity` (0.0247)rr (0.0127)rrr (0.0167)rrr (0.0161)rrr (0.0183) (0.0077)rrr
]-Statistic" 24.2738 24.4817 39.4987 23.5778 7.7816 67.5975
d.o.f. IS 16 21 IS l6 21
[p-value] (0.0605] [0.0795] [0.0085] [0.0726] [0.9551] (0.0000]
' Staodard errors are in parentltaes. Columtu (2) and (4) contain the gross wage aa an additioml inatrument
whik columas (3) aod (6) contain time dummies as inatruments.
' Elauicities are computed u their mean vahtes: oet reported wage - 10.19; net average hauly earnings -
10.93; S, - 3.084; l~ - 2179.48; MTR - 0.2979.
` MTR elauicity - (-aW, - IMTR,) x (MTR,Iti,).
' d.o.f. is the number of inatruments less parameters estimared and Ihe p-value is for tà null hypothesis that
the overideatifying ratrictioas arc na rejected.
r rr, rrr denotes significance u the 10, S, and 1 peroentlevels, respectively.Tabk 3: Iffienemporal Euler Equuioo'
Variabk Common Discount Rate Penon-Specific Diecaunt Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subjxtive Diacount 0.0662 0.0292
Rate (0.0193)rrr (0.0226)
{0.0355}r {0.0387}
Comnnt (e~ -0.4210 -0.9110 0.7978 0.4187
(0.2662) (0.2694)rrr (0.4475)r (0.3635)
{0.2373} {0.2374}'rr
Aseets (a,,,J 0.0037 0.0074 0.0061 0.0023
(0.0014)rrr (0.0015)rrr (0.0019)rrr (0.0013)r
{0.0062} {0.0062}
Children (o~,J 0.0291 0.0372 -0.3781 -0.2648
(0.0379) (0.0471) (0.2006)' (0.1669)
{0.0222} {0.0643}
Health Statua (o~~.,) -0.0071 0.7661 0.5846 0.5571
(0.2733) (0.3402)rr (0.3098)' (0.2586)..
{0.3733} {0.4958}
x-Conetaot Elasticity
(eJ~ 0.1477 0.1494 O.iS13 O.1S30
]-Statixic` 26.7807 36.2675 19.8931 36.3300
d.o.f l5 20 l6 20
[o-value} [0.0306] [0.0143] [0.2231} [0.0141]
~ Snndard grrors are in paremlxsa a~ corraxed snndard errors arc in {}. T~ firat-step indirect utiliry
parametero come from cotutm (3) of Tabk l. Columns (2) ard (4) have time dummiea appended w the
inatrumeat eet.
' e, - e. f !(e,,,)'(u,6, IAJ is computed u ib mean value, wóen ! ia the interumporal aubatitution elasticity
with rc~pxt W a cósnge in all gooda prica.
` d.o.f. ia the mimber of imtruments Ips parameten and the p-value rcported is for the null that the
overidentifying resrriaiom sre na rcjected.
r, rr, rrr deaoW aiguificaoce at the 10, S, and 1 perceat kvels, rcapectively.Tabk 4: Marginal Utility of Nd Weahh Updatiog Equation'
Wage ómovation Intercst Rue Wealth 2-Period Lag J-Statiatic"





-0.1236 0.0397 -0.0080 27.7499
(0.0749) (0.0145)rrr (0.0024)rsr [17,0.0479j
-0.0Ó85 0.0447 -0.008'1 inauumeat 33.2849
(0.0719) (0.0144)'rr (0.0023)rrr [18,0.0154]
-0.1345 0.0328 -0.0044 31.4296
(0.0648)rr (O.O124)rrr (0.0014)r" [17,0.017i]
-0.0744 0.0333 -0.0050 imtrument 36.8990
(O.OS66) (0.0117)rrr (O.OOl4)rrr (18,0.0054]
Snndard errors are in pveotheses. The dependent variabk for rowa (l) and (2) are cooaaucted by the
peraon-apxific discount rate model without time dtummiea, whik towa (3) and (4) include time dummiea.
` d.o.f. ia the number of instrumeots lesa parameten eatimated sod the p.value reported is for the mill
óypothesis that thc overidemifying restrictioos aro mt rojected.
r, rr, rrr denotea significutce at the 10, 5, aod 1 perceM kvela.
Tabk S: Distributioa of Selected Elasticitiea by Wealth Quartilea'
0-2s Percent zs-SO Perccnt 50-7s Percent 7s-100 Percent
Ut~enaated Wage 0.1112 0.1193 0.1328 0.1557
Compemated Wage O.I288 0.1380 0.1538 0.1809
(cJ
Marginal Tax Rate -0.0404 -0.0465 -0.0581 -0.0830
x~onatant(e,)` 0.1281 0.1373 0.1529 0.1557
(Common)
x-Cooatant(e,)" 0.1171 0.1435 0.1553 O.IB15
(Peraon-Specific)
Wagc Inoovation (ei„)` 0.0059 -0.0186 -0.0623 -0.0784
Eluticitiea arc oomputal at the mean valuea of variables within each quartik uaing the parametera from
modela with time dummies in the iastrument ad.
e, z e, t t(e~(u~4 ~~-
ea - C..(~~.i - ~ (~~.i))
eTable 6: Hours and Welfaro Reaponx to Alternative Tu Reforms by Wealth Quartile
Ch~nge in Houra Cóange in Taa Equivalent Welfare
Paymmta Varistion Variation
(R,AGp (96AGn
(1) Average 4.O19G -I00.0096 -22.56R~ -22.7496
No-Tu Ist Quartile 2.49 -100.00 -17.21 -17.30
Caae 2~ Quartile 2.82 -100.00 -17.4g -17.56
3rd Qusrtik 3.94 -100.00 -20.54 -20.67
4th Quartilc 6.94 -100.00 -30.27 -30.65
(2) Average 0.61 -6.28 -1.74 -1.75
l0 Percent lu Quartile 0.02 -9.25 -1.37 -1.38
Tu Cu[ 2nd Quartile 0.68 -8.73 -1.38 -1.39
3rd Quartile 0.62 -7.41 -1.57 -1.57
4th Quartik 1.13 -4.53 -2.29 -2.31
(3) Avenge 2.05 -37.56 -11.04 -11.16
Pre-ERTA to lst Quartile 1.71 -40.57 -8.65 -8.71
Poat-TRA86 2od Qusrtile 1.01 -39.69 -9.06 -9.12
Tu Rate Gtit 3rd Quartile 2.04 -39.32 -10.39 -10.47
4t6 Quartile 3.54 -35.49 -14.14 -14.37
(4) Avenge 3.12 ~46.17 -15.66 -15.82
Pre-ERTA to lu Quartile 2.39 -49.53 -13.80 -13.90
Poat-TRA86 2nd Quartile 2.30 ~13.87 -13.81 -13.90
Tu Rate and 3rd Qusrtile 2.93 ~4.43 -15.29 -15.43
Base Cut 4th Quartile 4.98 -45.96 -18.18 -18.46No. Autàor(s)
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